The prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distribution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises, in terms of …rst-order stochastic dominance, with income. Given mainstream functional form assumptions on utility and the distributions of ability and preferences, a simple statistic for the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity on marginal tax rates is derived. Numerical simulations and suggestive empirical evidence demonstrate the link between this potentially measurable statistic and the quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity for policy.
Introduction
In the early years of modern optimal tax research, theorists assumed all individuals have the same preferences over consumption and leisure. James A. Mirrlees's (1971) second simplifying assumption was that "Di¤erences in tastes...are ignored. These raise rather di¤erent kinds of problems, and it is natural to assume them away." This simpli…cation freed Mirrlees to assume that the only way in which people di¤er is in their ability to earn income. 1 His powerful approach-complete with its assumption of preference homogeneity-now dominates theoretical work on tax design.
The omission of this form of preference heterogeneity has cast a shadow over optimal tax research from the beginning, however, both because di¤erences in these preferences are an evident feature of reality and because omitting them is far from innocuous in Mirrlees's setting. Kahneman (2011) reports that such preference di¤erences are widespread among young adults and correlate with outcomes later in life. Data shown in Section 3 of this paper, from the World Values Survey and General Social Survey, reveal that respondents report a wide range of views toward the value of material possessions. More anecdotally, people choose a wide range of consumption-leisure bundles, even conditional on apparent budget constraints. Importantly, these preferences over consumption and leisure are observationally equivalent to the income-earning ability at the heart of the Mirrlees approach. That is, an individual may earn a low income, and respond to taxes the way he does, either because he has low ability or because he has a weak relative preference for consumption. As has long been recognized, for instance in the formal literature by Agnar Sandmo (1993) , the possibility of these two cases presents a challenge for optimal tax design. If an individual is to be compensated for having low ability but held responsible for his preferences, in the terms of Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet (2004) , society will want to redistribute income to a low earner in the …rst case but not in the second.
Complicating matters is that the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity on optimal redistribu- 1 Mirrlees was not the …rst to adopt this simpli…cation. Arthur Pigou (1928) wrote, in a classic text: "Of course, in so far as tastes and temperaments di¤er, allowance ought, in strictness, to be made for this fact...But, since it is impossible in practice to take account of variations between di¤erent people's capacity for enjoyment, this consideration must be ignored, and the assumption made, for want of a better, that temperamentally all taxpayers are alike." tion is ambiguous. While critics of redistribution have long stressed that income may signal preferences rather than ability 2 , in principle adding preference heterogeneity to the model may increase optimal redistribution. Intuitively, if preferences for consumption relative to leisure are lower among those with high incomes, attributing income variation to ability alone will understate the income-earning abilities of high earners and imply an optimal extent of redistribution that is too small. This theoretical ambiguity has been left unresolved in general settings by previous analyses. 3 As Louis Kaplow (2008) notes, "This di¢ culty is not merely technical; many have suspected that the nature of the optimum may change in important ways...Although such conjectures have been informally expressed, the issue has received little sustained attention."
In this paper, we derive two novel results that clarify preference heterogeneity's e¤ects on the optimal extent of redistribution.
First, we generalize a standard optimal tax model to compare the extent of redistribution under an optimal policy in which preference heterogeneity is allowed to exist to that under the Mirrleesian benchmark policy in which all heterogeneity is assumed to be in ability.
Our model fully nests the conventional model. We show that the prominent but unproven intuition that heterogeneity in preferences over consumption and leisure lowers optimal redistribution is incomplete but correct under a speci…c, plausible condition. In particular, if the distribution of the relative preference for consumption over leisure rises with income (in 2 See Robert Nozick (1974) , "Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or services di¤erently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness?" Or, Milton Friedman (1962) , "Given individuals whom we are prepared to regard as alike in ability and initial resources, if some have a greater taste for leisure and others for marketable goods, inequality of return through the market is necessary to achieve equality of total return or equality of treatment." 3 Mirrlees (1976 3 Mirrlees ( , 1986 ) addressed the general case but obtained inconclusive results. Some prior work adopts specialized settings, such as Sandmo's (1993) insightful analysis with only preference (not ability) heterogeneity; Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau, and Maria del Mar Racionero's (2002) results with two preference types, two ability levels, and quasilinear utility; and Fleurbaey and Maniquet's (2006) analysis with a speci…c normative approach. Other work has focused on numerical simulations, such as Ritva Tarkiainen and Matti Tuomala (2004) or Kenneth L. Judd and Che-Lin Su (2006), who explain the computational complexities associated with multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. Two other recent papers focus on related but somewhat di¤erent questions. Narayana Kocherlakota and Christopher Phelan (2009) focus on the policy implications of uncertainty over the relationship between individuals' preferences and another, welfare-relevant, dimension of heterogeneity such as wealth. They argue that such uncertainty causes a planner using a maximin objective to avoid redistributive policy that is optimal when no such uncertainty is present. Paul Beaudry, Charles Blackorby, and Dezso Szalay (2009) indirectly address preference di¤erences by including in their optimal tax analysis di¤erences in productivity of market and non-market labor e¤ort. They show that the optimal redistributive policy makes transfers to the poor conditional on work.
terms of …rst-order stochastic dominance), then optimal marginal tax rates are lower at all incomes, and redistribution to the lowest earner is less, than in the Mirrleesian case. We show this result analytically for the case of quasilinear utility studied in Diamond (1998), and we show through numerical simulations that it holds for more general utility functions with income e¤ects. As a consequence, the conventional Mirrleesian assumption of preference homogeneity ought not to be seen as neutral with respect to determining the optimal extent of redistribution.
Second, we derive a simple statistic for the e¤ect of heterogeneity in preferences on optimal marginal tax rates assuming plausible functional forms for ability and the distributions of ability and preferences. We demonstrate the link between this statistic and the quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity for optimal policy using numerical simulations calibrated to the U.S. economy. We also generate empirical estimates of this statistic for OECD countries and U.S. states and use them to show suggestive evidence that existing policy variation appears to be consistent with our theoretical …ndings. Though this simple statistic is not observable through conventional economic variables, our …ndings suggest it is a valuable target for future empirical work.
We obtain our novel analytical results by combining two recent innovations in the literature with a third innovation of our own. First, in a setting with a continuum of agents and standard utility functions, Philippe Choné and Guy Laroque (2010) show how heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of work can justify negative marginal tax rates at low incomes. They achieve this important …nding in part by collapsing multiple dimensions of heterogeneity into a single composite characteristic that determines behavior. This technique, similar to that used by Craig Brett and John Weymark (2003) , avoids the technical obstacle of multidimensional screening that had limited much of the prior work on preference heterogeneity. 4 We adopt an approach akin to Choné and Laroque's in order to reduce to a single dimension the heterogeneity driving individual behavior. While this technique cannot help with all conceivable dimensions of heterogeneity, 5 it is well-suited for the preferences over con- 4 Casey Rothschild and Florian Scheuer (2013) use a di¤erent method to avoid the technical problems with multiple dimensions of heterogeneity, in e¤ect giving one dimension priority in determining individual behavior. The type of multidimensionality at issue in this paper is not amenable to their approach. 5 For example, time discounting as in Mikhail Golosov, Maxim Troshkin, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Matthew Weinzierl (2013) or Peter Diamond and Johannes Spinnewijn (2011). sumption and leisure studied in this paper. Second, we adopt the moral reasoning behind the "second fairness requirement" in the prominent work of Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet (2006), which states that "the laisser-faire (this is, the absence of redistribution) should be the social optimum in the hypothetical case when all agents have equal earning abilities" even if they have di¤erent preferences. 6 In other words, we adopt the normative perspective that preferences over consumption and leisure do not justify redistribution by themselves. Though speci…c, this interpretation is the natural one if preferences are thought of as tastes as opposed to, for example, needs (see Kaplow 2008 for a discussion). Third, and crucially, we introduce the technique of studying how optimal policy changes when a given distribution of income is attributed to more than one source of heterogeneity, rather than how optimal policy changes when ability is augmented with additional sources of heterogeneity that change the distribution of income. This shift makes possible our progress over prior results. It has the additional virtue of formulating the problem in a way resembling that faced by policy makers, who must decide the appropriate extent of redistribution in the face of an observable income distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the generalized Mirrleesian optimal tax model that incorporates preference heterogeneity. Section 2 derives the analytical results on optimal redistribution with quasilinear utility. Section 3 derives a simple statistic for marginal tax rates for a familiar set of functional form assumptions and uses it to quantify the potential impact of preference heterogeneity on optimal policy through both numerical simulations and empirical evidence. The numerical simulations also demonstrate the robustness of the analytical …ndings from Section 2 to the use of a utility function that includes income e¤ects. Section 4 provides a concluding discussion.
A generalized model with preference heterogeneity
Our model closely follows (and fully nests) the conventional Mirrleesian setup in which a social planner designs taxes to maximize social welfare and a population of heterogeneous individuals choose labor e¤ort, taking the tax system as given, to maximize their individual utilities.
Individuals
A set of individuals of measure one, indexed by i, di¤er in both their abilities to convert labor e¤ort into earned income and, in a departure from the standard approach, their preferences for consumption relative to leisure. Individual i derives utility from consumption and leisure (equivalently, disutility from labor e¤ort) according to the following function:
where c i 0 denotes consumption, l i 0 denotes labor e¤ort, and i > 0 denotes preferences-all for individual i. We assume the standard conditions on the utility func-
As in the conventional model, labor e¤ort for individual i is calculated as l i = y i =w i ; where y i 0 denotes earned income and w i 0 denotes income-earning ability.
Two formal di¤erences capture the distinction between the conventional model and this generalization of it. First, individual type is now de…ned by a duple f i ; w i g, where the preference parameter i de ‡ates the quantity of labor supplied. In the conventional model, i = 1 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig: Here, "experienced labor" l i = i denotes the relative preferenceadjusted amount of labor e¤ort by individual i. Second, the utility function in (1) is typespeci…c, because utility as a function of consumption and labor e¤ort now depends on the individual's preference parameter i . In the conventional setup, heterogeneity enters only through the budget constraint and utility functions are homogeneous.
This formalization of preferences allows us to collapse the two dimensions of individual heterogeneity into a single "uni…ed type" n i = i w i , such that any joint distribution of preferences and ability ( ; w) generates a univariate distribution of uni…ed type F (n) with support over the range [n 0 ; 1). This uni…ed type serves as a one-dimensional measure of heterogeneity that determines i's observable behavior. It allows us to analyze optimal policy exactly as in the conventional approach, where the required technical conditions (especially the single-crossing property) are now assumed to hold with respect to uni…ed type rather than ability. This compression of multiple dimensions of heterogeneity into one is a particularly simple example of the technique used in Choné and Laroque (2010).
This uni…cation of types also provides a straightforward way to formalize the social planner's response to the normative complications raised by preference heterogeneity. We now turn to the planner's problem.
Social Planner
The social planner maximizes social welfare by specifying taxes as a di¤erentiable function of income, denoted T (y) : R 0 ! R, where income is a function of uni…ed type n > 0.
Social welfare W is the integral of the product of a function G(n) and scalar weights n .
The function G(n) represents the social value of the utility of an individual of type n, and we de…ne g (n) = dG(n)=dc(n) as the marginal social value of consumption for that individual. 7 We write G(n) and g(n) as functions of n to maximize the generality of the model; this need not imply that they depend on agents' types directly. We assume g(n) decreases in n, as is standard, providing a motive for redistribution from high types to low. To manage the addition of preference heterogeneity, the G(n) functions are weighted by type-speci…c adjustment factors n . Below, we describe how the values of n are chosen.
Maximization is subject to standard feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints.
Formally, the planner's problem is:
7 Familiar speci…cations of these functions in conventional models are, for example, G(n) = U (n) and g(n) = U c (n) for a utilitarian planner or G(n) = G(U (n)) and g(n) = G 0 (U (n))U c (n) with G 00 (U (n)) < 0 for a more redistributive planner.
where n 0 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig are weights on the social welfare values of individual utilities, subject to feasibility:
and incentive compatibility:
A tax function is said to be feasible if it satis…es condition (3) and incentive compatible if it satis…es condition (4).
This social planner's problem is formally similar to that in a conventional analysis with a generalized utilitarian planner, but the weights f n g play a novel role in this setting. For clarity, we will call each n the "scaling factor" for uni…ed type n. Given a vector of such scaling factors, or simply a "scaling", the planner values marginal consumption for type m relative to that for another type n as follows:
Naturally, these relative valuations have substantial e¤ects on optimal policy.
As the scaling f n g is empirically unidenti…ed, its selection is a normative decision. In a conventional model, type is fully determined by ability, and the choice of i is relatively straightforward. In Saez (2001), for example, the planner simply sets n = 1 for all n. In this model, however, the set of individuals of any given uni…ed type n may vary in the two underlying sources of heterogeneity, namely preferences and ability w. If these sources of heterogeneity have di¤erent normative signi…cance for the planner, the planner's values for the scaling f n g will be a¤ected. Without loss of generality, we will restrict our consideration to scalings such that E[ n ] = 1, since multiplying all values of g (n) by a common factor does not a¤ect the optimal policy. Pinning down the appropriate values for this scaling has been an obstacle to de…nitive results on preference heterogeneity and optimal redistribution.
Fortunately, the work of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) has established a way around that obstacle.
We follow Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) in imposing a normative requirement that we label preference neutrality. De…ning preference neutrality requires a preliminary step.
Consider the laissez-faire tax regime, in which individuals retain all the earnings they generate. In that setting, individual i maximizes utility in (1) subject to the laissez-faire bud-
0 denote individual i's choice in this setting. Then,
is the implicit function de…ned by the agent's …rst-order condition:
where U c and U l denote the partial derivatives of utility with respect to consumption and labor e¤ort. Our goal is to select a scaling such that this tax regime is optimal when ability is uniform, that is, when all income inequalities arise from di¤erences in preferences. Let g LF (n) denote the marginal social value of consumption for n under this tax regime. 8 Using this information, we de…ne preference neutrality as follows.
De…nition 1
The scaling f m g satis…es "preference neutrality" if and only if
where w = E [w i ], the mean wage in the economy.
9
In words, preference neutrality adjusts the marginal social weights n so that inequalities that would arise due to preferences if all agents had a common ability do not merit redis- = 1, implying the laissez-faire allocation is optimal. Since g LF (n) decreases with n, g LF ( w) is decreasing in , and therefore if the conditional distribution F ( i j i w i = m) …rst-order stochastically 8 The superscript LF is necessary, as g( ) may be endogenous to the tax regime in general. 9 As demonstrated in the appendix, for a common class of examples the choice w is irrelevant.
dominates F ( i j i w i = n) whenever m > n (intuitively, if the distribution of preferences is "rising"with incomes) then n is rising with n.
With the objective in (2), condition (5) means that under preference neutrality, preference heterogeneity alone does not justify redistribution. That idea has been understood for some time, and is clearly stated in (for example) Sandmo (1993) , but reliable implications of it for optimal policy have been elusive. We now turn to the task of deriving the implications of allowing this type of preference heterogeneity into a standard optimal tax model.
A su¢ cient condition for preference heterogeneity to reduce redistribution
In this section, we compare the tax policies that solve the planner's problem of Section 1 under two possible assumptions about the sources of heterogeneity. The benchmark assumption is that the distribution of uni…ed types F (n) is produced by a degenerate joint distribution of preferences and ability in which i = 1 and n i = w i , for all i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig. In contrast, the alternative assumption studied in this paper allows some heterogeneity in income to be attributed to heterogeneous preferences, so that i 6 = j for some types i; j.
We compare policies along two dimensions-progressivity and redistribution, which we formally de…ne as follows.
De…nition 2 Consider two feasible, incentive compatible, Pareto e¢ cient income tax func-
T (y) is "less progressive" thanT (y) if marginal tax rates under T (y) are less than those underT (y) for all agents, that is if T 0 (y(n)) <T 0 (ŷ(n)) for all n;
T (y) is "less redistributive" thanT (y) if the net tax on the lowest type agent under
Given these de…nitions, we can show a useful and intuitive lemma, proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If the tax function T (y) is less progressive than the tax functionT (y), then T (y) is less redistributive thanT (y).
To analyze the implications of preference heterogeneity for optimal tax policy, we use Diamond's (1998) well-known expression for optimal marginal tax rates when agent utility is quasilinear in consumption: that is when
with v 0 (l) < 0; v 00 (l) < 0: This case is particularly tractable, and it allows us to prove a sharp result that we formalize in the following proposition. 10 We have been unable to extend this result to the case of nonzero income e¤ects of tax changes-that is, when individuals' labor supply decisions are a¤ected by changes to marginal tax rates on incomes lower than their own. 11 We therefore rely on numerical simulations to con…rm that the proposition's …ndings extend to that more general case.
Incorporating our preference neutral scaling into Diamond's (1998) condition for the optimal marginal income tax rate yields
where " denotes the elasticity of taxable income, and denotes the shadow value of public funds. In the conventional approach, n represents ability; here we interpret n as uni…ed type and use the preference neutral scaling factors (n) to adjust for preference heterogeneity.
Note that we could incorporate the n weights into the G(n) functions. By separating them out, however, we can use the n terms to absorb any e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on the planner's objective. In particular, in this section we assume the g(n) values are independent of the n values. 12 This independence is useful in proving the following proposition. 10 Technically, the absence of income e¤ects means a change in the lump sum grant does not induce a change in labor supply, facilitating the proof. As Diamond notes, "In the presence of distorting taxes, income e¤ects imply that lump-sum taxes have e¢ ciency e¤ects since they change distorted labor supply decisions." 11 Analysis toward su¢ cient conditions for the case of income e¤ects is available from the authors. 12 The simplest form for G(n) yielding such independence is to set G(n) equal to scalars that depend on type n only, a frequently-used approach (see Salanié 2011 , for a textbook treatment). Given quasilinear utility, in this case the terms g(n) also depend only on type n; and g 0 (n) < 0 is assumed. As long as these Proposition 1 Let T (y) solve the planner's problem in (2) through (4) in the presence of preference heterogeneity, and letT (y) solve this problem with i = 1; 8i. If F ( jy i ) stochastically dominates F ( jy j ) whenever y i > y j , and if individual utility takes the quasilinear form in (6), then T (y) is less progressive and less redistributive thanT (y).
Proof.
The planner values consumption for uni…ed type n at (n)g(n)
We wish to sign the derivative of this expression with respect to -this will indicate the directional impact on marginal tax rates of perturbing the Mirrlees benchmark toward the true optimum under preference heterogeneity. By construction, g(n) does not depend on preferences, so g(n) does not vary with . Therefore the derivative of (8) with respect to , evaluated at = 0, is
The denominator is positive, so the sign is determined by the numerator, which can be manipulated as follows:
weights decline so that incentive constraints bind in the typical way, this setting yields results comparable to models with strictly concave social marginal utility of consumption, such as the standard utilitarian setup. A more nuanced form for G(n) also yielding such independence is as follows. De…ne h(n) as the di¤erence between the utility levels of individual n under the optimal policy (i.e., given values for the n that adjust for preference heterogeneity) and under the optimal policy given the conventional values n = 1 for all n: Then de…ne G (n) = G(U (n) h(n)), which we assume to be concave. By construction, U (n) h(n) obtains the same value for di¤erent values of n . Given quasilinear utility, g(n) = G 0 (U (n) h (n)) is therefore independent of n , and g 0 (n) < 0.
The right term integrates to zero. Since~ (n) is increasing in n, the left term is negative. Therefore the derivative of (8) with respect to is negative for all n-that is, perturbing the Mirrlees benchmark toward the true optimum lowers all marginal tax rates. The same argument holds at all 2 (0; 1), which, together with Lemma 1, implies Proposition 1.
In words, Proposition 1 says that the true optimal policy T (y) features smaller marginal tax rates and less redistribution than the Mirrlees benchmark policyT (y) whenever consumption preferences rise, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, with income.
It is important to note that this su¢ cient condition depends on the relationship between preferences and income-for which it seems highly plausible-not preferences and ability.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. If income variation is due to variation in both preferences for consumption relative to leisure (which does not merit redistribution) and ability (which does), then the optimal extent of redistribution depends on how preferences vary with income. If preferences and income move together, then attributing all of a high earner's income to ability would exaggerate his or her ability level and yield too great an extent of optimal redistribution. If, on the other hand, preferences fall with income, then high earners must have greater abilities than a model without preference heterogeneity would infer.
In that case, optimal redistribution rises relative to a conventional analysis. Proposition 1 clari…es a condition on the relationship between preferences and income that guarantees the former case holds, i.e., that preference heterogeneity lowers optimal redistribution. Proposition 1 establishes a new result that helps to resolve the theoretical ambiguity over the e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on optimal tax policy. To build on this result and obtain quantitative implications, we now turn to a more fully speci…ed model.
A simple statistic for the quantitative e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on redistribution
In this section, we choose speci…c functional forms-for the social welfare function G (n), individual utility, and the distributions of ability and preferences-enabling us to derive a second novel analytical result: a simple statistic for the e¤ect of heterogeneity in preferences on optimal marginal tax rates. We assume the planner is a "pure Utilitarian":
so that g (n) =
, that is, the social marginal value of consumption is the unscaled individual marginal utility of consumption. We assume that the utility function in expression
(1) takes the following familiar form:
where > 0, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, determines the concavity of utility from consumption (for which = 1 is taken to represent log utility from consumption), 1 a¤ects the elasticity of labor supply, and l i = y i =w i : We will further suppose that ln i and ln w i are jointly normally distributed, so that y LF has a lognormal distribution. Though evidence (see Saez 2001) suggests that the upper tail of the income distribution is better described as a Pareto distribution, lognormality has long been used in the optimal tax literature to describe most of the income distribution (see Tuomala 1990 ). Moreover, assuming preferences are bounded above, the optimal top marginal tax rate in this generalized setting will be the same as that obtained in the conventional analysis with no preference heterogeneity. The e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on tax rates is thus more relevant for the mass of the earnings distribution below the top tail, a mass well-described as lognormal.
Given these conditions, we can prove the following result relating the joint distribution of preferences and income to the optimal tax structure. 
Proof.
Under the utility function in (10), y LF ( i w i ) = ( i w i ) + 1 , and g LF (n) = y LF (n) , so, from (5), the preference neutral scaling and the scaling f g satis…es
Note that under this utility function, the preference neutral scaling does not depend on the mean wage w.
13
Because the conditional distribution of ln i is normal, the numerator can be written
By construction, ln n i and ln i are jointly normally distributed, and therefore the conditional variance var (ln i j ln n i ) is independent of ln n i . Therefore the right exponentiated factor in (13) is constant with respect to n i -call its value K. When X and Y are jointly normal,
, so we rewrite the expectation in (13) as
Substituting (14) into (13) and then into (12), we have:
In particular, the scaling n = n ( + 1 ) is preference neutral; plugging it into the wellknown condition derived in Saez (2001) yields the optimal nonlinear income tax.
14 Thus the population statistic is su¢ cient to incorporate fully the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity in this case.
This simple and intuitive 15 statistic proves to be a convenient tool with which to examine the quantitative, not just qualitative, implications of preference heterogeneity for policy. To illustrate this, note that = 0 corresponds to the Mirrlees case of homogeneous preferences and = 1 corresponds to the opposite extreme of homogeneous ability. In the latter case, n = n ( + 1 ) for all n, and the optimal extent of redistribution is zero. If < 0, optimal redistribution is greater than in the conventional analysis. 16 We can also write as the product of the correlation between ln and ln n and the ratio of their standard deviations. Thus, a particularly simple case obtains when preferences and ability are independent. Then var(ln n) = var(ln ) + var(ln w), and = var(ln )=var(ln n), while 1 = var(ln w)=var(ln n). That is, when preferences and ability are independent, represents the "share"of of the variation in income driven by preference heterogeneity.
Numerical simulations of optimal policy
We now use calibrated numerical simulations and the statistic to characterize the potential quantitative e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on optimal policy.
14 Of course, any other scaling that yields the same ratios m = n for all m and n would generate the same optimal income tax, as this would amount to multiplying all agents'utility functions by the same constant. 15 Note that can be interpreted as the coe¢ cient from a regression of ln on ln n. 16 This discussion of Proposition 2 shows that it is closely related to Proposition 1 from the previous section. If preferences rise, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, with income, then the covariance between preferences and uni…ed type (equivalently, income) is positive, and therefore > 0.
Our calibration strategy is to match the income distribution chosen by individuals in this Section's model, taking U.S. tax policy as given, to the empirical income distribution in the United States, and thus infer a distribution of uni…ed types F (n). We assume a pure Utiltarian social planner. We consider a range of utility function parameter values for expression (10) that spans most mainstream estimates: 2 f0:5; 1; 2g and 2 f2; 3; 6g.
We use data from the Tax Policy Center reporting e¤ective marginal and average tax rates at the following income percentiles: 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 99, and 99.9. Using the utility function (10), and given values for and , we can back out the implied uni…ed type n i at each quantile. We assume that the uni…ed types n are drawn from a lognormal distribution with parameters and . Then, we search for the values of and that minimize the sum of squared di¤erences between the resulting simulated income quantile thresholds and the empirical ones. For example, using the parameter values = 1 and = 3, the resulting parameter estimates are = 1:6673 and = 1:0025. Our conceptual results are not sensitive to these values, but having a realistic calibration makes the magnitudes of our results easier to interpret.
We then use this calibrated model to calculate optimal policy under a range of values for as de…ned in (11) : We choose values for the welfare weights i to satisfy Preference Neutrality and solve for optimal policy according to the planner's problem in (2) through (4). In Figure 1 , the Mirrleesian benchmark is the = 0 scenario, where all heterogeneity is ascribed to ability. The opposite assumption, where all heterogeneity is ascribed to preferences, is = 1: An intermediate value of = 0:3 is used to provide a sense for the e¤ects of a more moderate adjustment to the standard model. Finally, we show the results for = 0:1, a negative value. A negative indicates that high incomes are associated with low preferences for consumption (and thus very high abilities). 17 The results for positive values of suggest that preference heterogeneity has the potential to substantially reduce the optimal extent of redistribution across a given income distribution. For example, while the conventional case of = 0 recommends a tax rate of 49 percent at $500,000 of annual earnings, the case with = 0:3 recommends a rate of 40 percent. For reference, the empirical average tax rate at $500,000 in 2012 was approximately 27 percent. The results for = 0:1 con…rm the role of the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 17 It is theoretically possible for to be greater than one, as well, which would indicate that high incomes are associated with very high preferences for consumption (and thus very low abilities). If > 1, optimal policy is even less redistributive than the = 1 case shown in Figure 1 . This case is also considered in Chonè and Laroque (2010) in their analysis of when optimal marginal tax rates are negative. 1 , as in that case preference heterogeneity increases the optimal extent of redistribution and preferences for consumption do not rise with income. Figure 2 demonstrate that the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity is not sensitive to the particular values selected for and . They also suggest that these e¤ects, and therefore the conclusions of Proposition 1, are not sensitive to the inclusion of income e¤ects.
The results in
Though is not conventionally observable, these simulations show its value as a straightforward way in which to modify a numerical version of the model to determine the potential quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity. Moreover, may be a more plausible empirical target than has previously been identi…ed, especially if unconventional sources of evidence are brought to bear, as we now show.
Suggestive empirical patterns
To demonstrate the empirical potential of our results, and to reinforce the usefulness of the population statistic ; we now provide some suggestive evidence that preference heterogeneity may be a¤ecting real-world policy across countries and U.S. states. We emphasize that these results are admittedly far from conclusive and are vulnerable to a variety of criticisms. Our hope is that they stimulate further data gathering and empirical work that can more reliably test for the implications of the theory in existing policy. ...It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things."
We will use the answers to the question to measure preferences f i g : This question is wellposed for our purposes, as it attempts to have the respondent re ‡ect on his or her underlying preferences rather than how he or she feels in the status quo, i.e., "on the margin." Moreover, the World Values Survey's international coverage is unmatched. The World Values Survey also asks respondents to report their place in the income distribution (it asks which of ten "steps" the respondent's household income falls into). Since income increases monotonically with uni…ed type, we use these reported values as a measure of uni…ed type fn i g. 19 It is 18 Panel analysis would be desirable, but the survey data we use to measure preferences is available over at most a ten-year horizon. We believe this is too narrow a window over which to expect either meaningful changes in preference variation or a response to any such changes in policy, so we leave the analysis of panel data for future research. 19 The distribution of responses is far from uniform across deciles in most countries, which could re ‡ect either the pattern of sampling or surveyor and respondent behavior toward such a question. Though their exact meaning is ambiguous, these data are arguably superior even to perfect information on individuals' incomes (which, regardless, we lack) because we are using them in concert with individuals'stated attitudes toward the importance of being "rich." Income data that re ‡ect a respondent's perceived place in the income distribution may provide a more appropriate match to these preference data. Related, we calculate in this analysis using the levels of preferences and income reported, not the logs of those levels. The reason is that income is reported on a linear scale from 1 to 10, so that individuals are likely interpreting the scale roughly as deciles. If income is distributed roughly log-normally, taking logs of these levels would be redundant. For possible to calculate the covariance of these data within each country, giving us all of the components required to calculate . We relate these values of to a standard measure of redistribution, the level of social (transfer) expenditures as a share of GDP, as reported by the OECD. Such expenditures include bene…ts for the poor, disabled, and elderly, as well as health-related and other transfer programs. We are able to calculate for 13 countries with PPP-adjusted GDP per capita greater than $25,000 in 2005 U.S. dollars, a simple threshold that helps to control for the wide range of institutional variables that likely a¤ect the scale of redistribution. Figure 3 shows the results visually. A weak but noticeable negative relationship between redistribution and is apparent in Figure 3 , consistent with the theory developed above. That is, countries in which preference heterogeneity plays a larger role in explaining income variation appear to have less redistributive policies. 20 The point estimate of the coe¢ cient on is -64.1, and it is signi…cant at the 15 percent level (with a standard error of 39.9); it is also the slope of the dashed consistency, we assume that the preference scale represents a similar implicit transformation. Nevertheless, if we calculate using the logs of these scales instead, the sign and signi…cance of the coe¢ cient on are virtually unchanged from the analysis shown. 20 It may be of interest to note that the pattern in Figure 3 is consistent with Alesina and Angeletos (2005) . In redistributive countries, small implies that ability-"luck" in their model-plays a large role in determining income relative to preferences-"e¤ort" in their model. calculating values for because we cannot link respondents preferences and income. 21 As an alternative, we compare redistribution to the ratio of the standard deviation of preferences to the standard deviation of log income in a state. 22 Recall that equals this ratio multiplied by the correlation between preferences and income. To the extent that this correlation varies across states independently of the ratio we are able to calculate, our approach will give a reliable indication of the relationship between redistribution and . For redistribution we follow Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) , who calculate the di¤erence between the (statutory)
average state income tax rates at the $100,000 and $10,000 income levels in 1989. Figure 4 shows the results (con…dentiality prevents us from identifying the states). 21 The geographic identi…cation codes of the GSS are closely protected to ensure con…dentiality. They are used in these analyses but cannot be shared by the author. To obtain the data, contact the National Opinion Research Center at www.norc.org. 22 We estimate the variance of log income using state-level annual wages at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oessrcst.htm).
We select the Pareto log-normal distribution that best matches these observed data (in terms of minimum squared errors at the observed values of the distribution function), then calculate the variance of log incomes for each calibrated distribution. As Figure 4 shows, the same suggestive pattern as was apparent across countries appears to hold across U.S. states. The coe¢ cient on the ratio of the standard deviation of preferences to the standard deviation of income is -0.017, which is signi…cant at the 2 percent level (it is the slope of the dashed best-…t line shown in the …gure). If we control for the log of average personal income in each state and the share of state income claimed by the top decile of earners (a proxy for inequality), the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient and its signi…cance both slightly increase.
We reiterate that these empirical patterns are meant to suggest, not prove, that the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity as identi…ed in the theory and captured (under speci…c functional form assumptions) by the statistic may be consistent with variation in existing policy. At the least, these analyses demonstrate that further empirical study of preference heterogeneity's e¤ects may be both possible and rewarding.
Conclusion
By adopting and adding to recent innovations in optimal tax analysis, we have shown that long-standing intuitions about preference heterogeneity reducing optimal redistribution are incomplete but correct given a plausible condition on how preferences relate to income. We have also shown that a simple statistic for this e¤ect exists, assuming familiar functional forms for utility and the distributions of ability and preferences, and we have shown how that statistic provides a straightforward and potentially empirically-relevant way to gauge the quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity for redistribution.
Though these results modify those of the conventional Mirrleesian approach, we see them as essential steps toward strengthening the modern theory of optimal tax design. While preference di¤erences have been largely left out of that theory, they are readily apparent in the real world and have long been a staple of broader debates over taxation. Given the potential empirical and normative importance of preference heterogeneity demonstrated in this paper, it seems (at least to us) to be a feature of reality that a convincing theory of optimal taxation ought to include.
Appendix
In this appendix, we prove two results mentioned in the text.
Lemma 1:
If the tax function T (y) is less progressive than the tax functionT (y), then T (y) is less redistributive thanT (y).
Proof.
Suppose on the contrary that T (y) were more redistributive, so that T (y(n 0 )) <T (ŷ(n 0 )) (note that these taxes on the lowest type agent are likely to be negative). Consider a reform ofT (y) (not necessarily feasible or incentive compatible) that maintains each agent's earningsŷ(n), but lowers each agent's marginal tax rate to T 0 (ŷ(n)) and raises consumption byT (ŷ(n 0 )) T (y(n 0 )) > 0. Since earnings are unchanged and consumption is higher, each agent must be made better o¤ by this reform. Now suppose agents are allowed to optimize (while the tax function is adjusted to maintain each type's marginal tax rate). By assumed incentive compatibility of T (y), they will select y(n), and this adjustment cannot decrease utility. Therefore all agents are strictly better o¤ under T (y) thanT (y), contradicting our assumption thatT (y) was Pareto e¢ cient. Therefore, T (y) is less redistributive thanT (y).
Next, the proof of Proposition 2 stated the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 The preference neutral scaling is invariant to the choice of reference wage w when the social welfare function takes the utilitarian form in (9) and the utility function U (c; l) takes the form in (10).
Given the functional form assumptions in the lemma, g LF ( i w) = U c y LF ( w i ); y LF ( w i )=( w i ) .
Preference neutrality therefore requires that the scaling f i g I i=1 satis…es
U c (y LF ( w i ); y LF ( w i )=( w i )) U c (y LF ( w j ); y LF ( w j )=( w j )) = j i ; 8i; j:
Let " denote the elasticity of taxable income under the laissez-faire tax regime: Let denote the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. For the class of utility functions in the statement of the lemma, " and are constant. To see the e¤ect of varying w on the preference neutral scaling, we di¤erentiate (15) with respect to w, where derivatives are evaluated at y LF ( w i ) and y LF ( w j ):
